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THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST INF:
STRATEGY, TACTICS, MEANS

Alexander R. Alexiev

February 1985

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Prepared for

The United States Air Force

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
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Beginning in 1979, the Soviet Union mounted a major effort to prevent the deployment of NATO's INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces), which was scheduled to begin in 1983. The campaign failed to achieve its main objective, but it remains an instructive example of the Soviet political modus operandi and perhaps the best case study of a concerted Soviet effort to manipulate domestic trends in Western countries. This Note attempts to provide some insight into Soviet tactics and operational style. It places the INF issue within the framework of Soviet security concepts, reviews Soviet efforts to influence decisionmaking elites in West Germany against INF and to exacerbate U.S.-European friction within NATO, and analyzes the methods used by the Soviets in their campaign to co-opt the West German peace movement. The author finds that the campaign waged by the Soviets demonstrated a remarkable organizational and political capability which enabled them and their allies to exploit large numbers of noncommunists in West Germany, and contribute to the growing polarization of West German politics.



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PREFACE

This Note was prepared as part of the Project AIR FORCE study, "Nuclear Employment in the Theater," which is examining a variety of political and military issues associated with future nuclear strategy, doctrine, and force posture as they relate to deterrence of conflict in the theater, principally the European theater. The Note analyzes Soviet efforts to undermine NATO nuclear decisions, focusing on the recent Soviet campaign against NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

SUMMARY

For four years, from late 1979 to December 1983, the Soviet Union engaged in a major campaign to forestall the NATO INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) deployments designed to counterbalance the Soviet SS-20 buildup that began in 1977. Moscow's determination to prevent the INF deployments reflected the Soviet fear that the INF would negate tangible Soviet military-political and psychological gains in the European theater and would reverse the real or perceived decline of the Western alliance's capabilities and cohesion that occurred during the years of detente. The expected political impact of successful INF deployments was thus the primary factor in the Soviet reaction, although the military capabilities of INF also had a number of disturbing implications for the Soviets.

The Soviet campaign against INF used a two-tiered strategy: a "campaign from above" and a "campaign from below." The former was directed at European establishment and decisionmaking elites and was intended to cause a political reversal of the deployment decision, while the latter sought, through concerted "active measures," to exploit European and especially West German popular fears, anti-Americanism, and misgivings about nuclear arms to create sufficient mass opposition to prevent deployment.

The "campaign from above" attempted to drive a wedge between the United States and its West European allies by portraying Washington under the Reagan Administration as a reckless and bellicose power bent on confrontation and willingly endangering European security in the pursuit of its political and economic goals. Juxtaposed to this malevolent image was the Soviet Union, presented through an intensive "peace offensive" as a peaceful, benign, and reliable security partner to Western Europe. The peace offensive essentially consisted of a vast array of Soviet negotiation proposals and initiatives. These were of four major types:

- Unequal proposals
- Peripheral proposals
- Trial balloons
- Propaganda proposals

Collectively, these proposals aimed to convince the West European public of the peace-loving nature of Soviet policies, to weaken NATO cohesion and sow confusion among decisionmakers, to induce preemptive NATO concessions, if possible, and to preserve the Soviet INF superiority, while keeping U.S. systems out of Europe. At the same time, Moscow was conducting a campaign of subtle and not-so-subtle threats of dire political, security, and economic consequences the INF deployment would have for Western Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The "campaign from below," like similar campaigns in the past, was designed to exploit the popular and legitimate concern of many Europeans about nuclear weapons through a well-organized process of ideological and organizational penetration of peace movements and their sympathizers. This effort was facilitated by the existence of a ready-made organizational structure, which consisted of a series of Soviet front organizations at both international and national levels, all of which were controlled directly or indirectly by the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, working closely with the International Information Department and the Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the KGB. The most influential of these front organizations at the international level were the World Peace Council based in Helsinki, the Christian Peace Conference based in Prague, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Federation of Democratic Women, and the World Federation of Scientific Workers.

Subordinated to Soviet front organizations at the national level in West Germany were numerous communist or communist-controlled organizations that were responsible for carrying out the "campaign from below" at the local level. The most important of these, the German Communist Party (DKP), provided sometimes unwelcome but nonetheless effective guidance and organizational expertise throughout the campaign.

Together with its youth and student affiliates and a large network of nominally noncommunist organizations it controls, the DKP--which is financed through East Germany--had at its disposal some 90,000 disciplined cadres available for anti-INF activities. Of these, 400 highly trained professionals were involved in the campaign on a full-time basis.

The main strategy pursued by the DKP and its allies in the "campaign from below" was to promote a "popular front" with the numerous noncommunist elements in the peace movement that would influence the movement into a decisively anti-Western orientation while deflecting criticism of the Soviet Union. Particular attention was paid to fostering a united front with anti-establishment political elements such as the Greens, the Social Democratic Party (SPD)--particularly its left wing--and powerful societal groups such as the churches and the trade unions.

The key operational tactic used by the DKP was a determined effort to dominate the organizational and preparatory stages of the most significant peace-movement activities and demonstrations. In this, the pro-Soviet elements, with their superior organization and discipline, were highly successful. Only 3 to 5 percent of the 3 million or so West Germans participating in peace-movement activities were extreme leftists or communists, yet these elements provided 20 percent of the participants in the key demonstrations, 40 percent of the demonstration coordinators, and well over 50 percent of the demonstration organizers. This explains to a considerable extent the decidedly anti-Western and anti-American orientation of the West German peace movement and its rather cavalier treatment of the Soviet Union.

Yet, in the final analysis, the Soviet campaign failed to stop the INF deployments, which began to be carried out according to schedule in late 1983. NATO's ability to carry out the deployment and the initial decline of the peace movement thereafter demonstrated conclusively that the alliance was still viable and that the majority of West Europeans stood behind it. Nonetheless, it would be incorrect to consider the Soviet campaign an inept or wasted effort; despite its failure to prevent INF, the campaign was a highly competent effort that holds a number of lessons and implications for the West.

First and foremost, it demonstrated a remarkable organizational and political capability which enabled the Soviets and their allies to exploit large numbers of noncommunists in West Germany, a country that had been considered essentially free of communist, let alone Soviet, influence. This in itself is significant, since it had been almost taken for granted in the West that the Soviet Union, burdened by an increasingly ossified ideology and challenged by various Eurocommunist deviations, had ceased to be a relevant political factor and exercised little influence in West European societies. In this respect, Moscow's ability to mount a significant propaganda campaign is impressive and indicative of the effective work and coordination of the Soviet fronts, whose important role in Soviet foreign political activities is often underestimated or even dismissed. The anti-INF campaign illustrated the parallel activities of and coordination among the different elements--diplomacy, propaganda, the KGB, front organizations, and the military--that make up the means and instrumentalities of Soviet foreign political pursuits.

The INF campaign also had some negative implications for NATO. It undoubtedly contributed to the growing polarization of the West German political landscape and was probably one of the factors in the noticeable shift to the left of the SPD and the labor unions in the past two years.

Despite its failure to prevent INF deployment, there was nothing in this experience that is likely to discourage Moscow from continued use of "campaigning" as a tool of Soviet foreign policy.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Beginning in late 1979, the Soviet Union mounted a major effort to prevent the deployment of NATO's INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces), which was scheduled to begin in late 1983. The campaign failed to achieve its main objective, and Pershing II and GLCM (ground-launched cruise missile) deployments began as planned in December 1983. Despite this failure, the Soviet anti-INF campaign remains a fascinating and instructive example of the Soviet foreign political modus operandi and perhaps the best case study of a concerted Soviet effort to manipulate domestic trends in Western countries--in this case, the peace movement in West Germany.

This study attempts to provide some insight into Soviet tactics and operational style. Section II places the INF issue within the framework of Soviet security concepts and examines the rationale of the Soviet reaction to NATO's dual-track deployment decision. Section III reviews Soviet efforts to influence decisionmaking elites in West Germany against INF and to exacerbate U.S.-European friction within NATO. Section IV analyzes the methods and means used by the Soviets in their campaign to coopt and exploit the West German peace movement. Section V attempts to assess the impact and the lessons of the campaign for both the Soviet Union and the West.

II. SOVIET SECURITY CONCEPTS AND INF

During the first four years of the 1980s, Soviet policies toward Western Europe, particularly West Germany, were dominated to an extent seldom observed before by a single issue: the modernization of NATO's INF and the prevention of its deployment. To understand the rationale behind the Soviet campaign against INF, it is necessary to examine the perceived impact of the INF deployment within the framework of Soviet objectives in Europe.

Soviet political desiderata and security concerns on the continent are both essentially political in nature. Moscow's broad political objectives in Europe include:

- Undermining the military and political cohesion of the Western alliance.
- Decoupling the United States from Western Europe, preferably by means of American and European self-isolation.
- Neutralizing Western Europe politically, not through "Finlandization," but within the framework of a European system of "peaceful coexistence."
- Establishing the Soviet Union as the dominant political factor in all of Europe (this does not necessarily mean incorporating Western Europe into the Soviet bloc).

Western Europe has not figured prominently among Soviet military security concerns since World War II, despite constant propaganda to the contrary. The one threat perceived as a real security concern is the essentially political threat posed by Western Europe to continued Soviet domination of Eastern Europe: the possibility of influencing and encouraging a disintegration of the Soviet hegemonial system that could spill over into the Soviet Union itself. It could be argued that the Soviets perceive a secure and prosperous Western Europe as potentially exacerbating Soviet control problems in Eastern Europe, while an insecure and intimidated one would be much less of a negative

influence.¹ The Soviet dilemma, which in turn becomes a problem for the West, is that the nature of the Soviet system makes it impossible to pursue and solve these objectives and concerns through political means, so the Soviets are forced to rely on military means to achieve political ends. Although this has always been the case to some degree, it has become even more pronounced as a seemingly permanent systemic crisis continues to affect the nonmilitary aspects of the Soviet system. With a political ideology that has declined from being an attractive utopia for many Western idealists to little more than an ossified and barren dogma, rejected even by many communists, and an economic model that is a demonstrated failure, the Soviet Union has used its growing military power as the major, if not the sole determinant of its great-power status. And Soviet experience in the past two decades, unlike that of the Western nations, has given Moscow no reason to doubt the continuing political utility of military power.

In this light, both the SS-20 deployment and the Soviet reaction to NATO's determination to redress the balance become understandable. What the Soviet leaders sought to accomplish with the installation of SS-20s in Europe was the kind of recognized and uncontested superiority in nuclear theater capability that they have long enjoyed in conventional theater weapons. Such superiority would be a powerful political and psychological asset in Soviet dealings with the West Europeans. This is not to say that the SS-20s--or, for that matter, any of the other Soviet programs--are irrelevant in military-operational terms. They do have a clear-cut military rationale and well-defined missions. Yet within the European theater framework, their military potential will continue to be subordinate to their political utility, for as long as Moscow is not completely certain that a European conflict will not escalate into a strategic conflagration, the Soviets are not likely to consider a European military option as viable.

During the late 1970s, when the Soviets began their concerted effort to achieve theater nuclear superiority, a number of other developments created a political climate in Europe, and especially in West Germany, that appeared to be conducive to Soviet advances toward

¹ For a perceptive analysis of Soviet views on security in Europe, see Alois Mertes, *Europa Archiv*, April 10, 1983, pp. 187-196.

long-standing objectives. First, there was a noticeable decline in European confidence in the United States as a reliable and indispensable protecting power (*Schutzmacht*). These doubts stemmed partly from the gradual decline of U.S. military power vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union that resulted particularly from the U.S. experience in Vietnam and the trauma of Watergate, and partly from what appeared to be erratic and contradictory policies pursued by Washington, epitomized by the neutron-bomb debacle. Paradoxically, during the same period, Western Europe did not perceive an increasing threat from the Soviet Union despite the Soviet offensive buildup, both conventional and nuclear. These evolving attitudes were also affected by domestic political developments in West Germany, which remains the main focus of both Soviet and American policies in the region. In West Germany, the twin pillars on which social-democratic policies had been based for a decade--an aggressive expansion of the social-welfare system and Ostpolitik--came under severe strains that undermined consensus and led to increasing polarization. Ostpolitik, whose declared objective had been to encourage positive change in the Soviet bloc through a policy of rapprochement (*Wandel durch Annäherung*), had generally proven a disappointment except in the eyes of its most ardent supporters. Moreover, the SPD's desire to cling to these policies worked to the detriment of alliance cohesion and seemed to benefit the Soviet bloc. Willy Brandt's shibboleth, "In order to change the status quo one has to accept it," resulted, in the words of one observer, in the recognition that "in order to bring about improvements in the relations with communist regimes, one has to reassure them, and ... to reassure them one has to help them stabilize their rule."² This attitude was perhaps best expressed by the architect of Ostpolitik, Egon Bahr, the security expert of the SPD, who after the imposition of martial law in Poland argued that the interests of the Polish people may have to be sacrificed for the sake of detente.³ An important consequence of this shift was a growing reluctance on the part of key political actors to see any threatening or offensive intentions in the Soviet buildup. Herbert Wehner, the grand old man of the SPD and

² Pierre Hassner, "Western European Perceptions of the USSR," *Daedalus*, Winter 1979, p. 145.

³ See *Die Zeit*, February 7, 1982.

perhaps its most powerful politician at the time, stated unequivocally in 1979 that there was no Soviet threat to Europe and that the Soviet military buildup was strictly defensive.⁴

Such attitudes, though by no means those of the majority, were sufficiently prevalent among important elites to create a sense of an ideological decoupling from the United States in the early 1980s, when a conservative American backlash had brought to power an administration critical of what it perceived as excessive social welfare spending, deeply concerned about the Soviet buildup, and determined to rebuild U.S. military power.

In these circumstances of relative discord within the NATO alliance and differing perceptions of the nature of the Soviet threat, Moscow was suddenly faced with NATO's decision in December 1979 to install two weapon systems, Pershing II and GLCMs. This decision had significant military implications, perhaps the most important of which concerned the additional military options NATO defense planners would have and the likelihood that INF deployment would encourage formulation of a more realistic nuclear doctrine that could only enhance deterrence. For example, the INF deployment was likely to relieve NATO commanders of the extreme difficulties they would face in attempting to use short-range nuclear weapons in a war-fighting situation. To avoid being overrun by the Soviet army in a rapid offensive, short-range weapons such as the Lance and nuclear artillery might have to be pulled back. Yet if they were later needed to interdict Warsaw Pact second-echelon reinforcements, they might have to be exploded on German or even West German territory--a nightmare scenario for the West Germans. The INF deployments make it clear that NATO is not likely to be self-deterred from using nuclear weapons in a war. This, of course, greatly increases their deterrence value. Most important, the new INF gave NATO the ability to strike deep in Soviet territory and thus denied the Soviets the ability to conduct a nuclear war in the European theater from a sanctuary. Nonetheless, the principal threat of the INF to the Soviets is a political one. The INF deployments demonstrated a renewed American dedication to the defense of Europe and a reassertion of U.S. leadership in the alliance. They also had the effect of blurring the distinction

⁴ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 4, 1979.

between theater and strategic forces, which reinforced the coupling of U.S. defense of Europe and the homeland. Further, the ability of the Western alliance to reach and stick by the deployment decision showed that NATO remained a viable defense alliance.

Despite the concerted efforts of Moscow's propaganda machine to prove that the INF deployments provided the United States with a first-strike capability and demonstrated aggressive intentions, the Kremlin's real concerns about the political dimension occasionally could be glimpsed. Thus, even before the INF decision was made, the chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Boris Ponomarev, argued in *Pravda*:

We cannot fail to see that in the event the decision is adopted, the United States hopes that a qualitatively new military-political situation will emerge....⁵

Somewhat later, another noted Soviet expert, General Milshtein of the Institute for the Study of the USA, wrote with concern that the United States was banking on the political utility of nuclear weapons as "means of resolving international problems in its own favor."⁶ Perhaps the clearest expression of the real Soviet concern was expressed in the following commentary in the Soviet Army daily, *Krasnaya zvezda*:

The new missiles are needed by Washington and the NATO bloc for something quite different--to obtain superior positions in both politics and strategy. In policy this is alleged by a chance to exert political pressure from a position of strength.⁷

In short, if allowed to be carried out, NATO's deployment of INF threatened to neutralize the hoped-for political utility of the costly SS-20 program and also to negate many of the perceived Soviet achievements in Europe in the 1970s. On the other hand, if deployment

⁵ *Pravda*, November 18, 1979.

⁶ M. A. Milshtein, "Some Characteristics of Present Day U.S. Military Doctrine," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No. 5, May 1980.

⁷ *Krasnaya zvezda*, June 30, 1981.

could be aborted--by whatever means--not only would these negative consequences be avoided, but a greater disarray in NATO and a more congenial climate for Soviet machinations seemed likely to obtain.

"Campaigning" to achieve a particularly important objective has, of course, been a reliable tool of Soviet foreign policy since Lenin's bolsheviks came to power. Indeed, the first official act of the fledgling Soviet government was to issue a "decree of peace" designed to alleviate the immediate military threat to the survival of the regime. In later years, full-fledged campaigns were conducted for "collective security" in the mid-1930s, against the atomic bomb in the 1940s, to prevent German rearmament in the 1950s, and to prevent neutron-bomb production in 1978, to name but a few. In general, a Soviet campaign requires mobilization of the arsenal of Soviet political, diplomatic, and propaganda resources, including disinformation, active measures, and covert activities. The campaign against INF provides perhaps the best illustration in Soviet history of this modus operandi. In its scope, intensity, and duration, it is very likely the most determined effort of its kind to date.

In its drive to forestall the deployment of NATO's INF, Moscow pursued a dual-track approach, consisting of a "campaign from above" to reverse the NATO decision by influencing the responsible decisionmaking elites, and a parallel "campaign from below" to exploit popular fears, pacifism, and misgivings about nuclear arms and to create sufficient mass opposition to make the deployment impossible.

III. THE CAMPAIGN FROM ABOVE

The "campaign from above," which was by far the more visible of the two, pursued a twofold strategy. First, it attempted to drive a wedge between the United States and its NATO partners by presenting the INF modernization as a program that served Washington's nefarious and aggressive purposes, while endangering the Western Europeans and especially the FRG. Second, Moscow launched a "peace offensive" to portray itself as willing to compromise and reach a negotiated solution, while at the same time using scare tactics and threatening dire consequences if its demands were not met. Particularly in the later stages of the campaign, the Soviets tried to encourage a split in the German SPD leadership and undermine the consensus on the INF issue by cultivating "farsighted" and "progressive" elements within the SPD.

THE UNITED STATES AS THE INF VILLAIN

From the very beginning, one of the major objectives of the Soviet campaign was to portray the United States as an increasingly aggressive and reckless power whose policies deliberately endangered the security and interests of Western Europe. Moscow sought to exploit and reinforce the growing doubts of the Europeans about the U.S. nuclear guarantee, as well as their uneasiness about the evident shift in American policy toward greater assertiveness under the Reagan Administration. Soviet theorists had noted growing European doubts as early as the mid-1970s and by the end of the decade were openly claiming that U.S. nuclear strategic forces which had once been NATO's "sword and shield" no longer served the latter function.¹ This was ascribed to achievements of detente and the positive change in the "correlation of forces" in the world, which had "very strongly devalued in the eyes of the Europeans the American 'nuclear guarantee' of NATO."² Seeking to exploit such

¹ Y. P. Davidov, *USA-Western Europe in Partnership and Rivalry*, Nauka, Moscow, 1978, p. 138. Cited in *Research and Analytical Evaluation of the Soviet Union and Modernization of Nuclear Weapons Forces in Europe*, Advanced International Studies Institute, Washington, D.C., April 1982, p. 146.

² Ibid.

misgivings (the alleviation of which had in fact been one of the psychological determinants of the dual-track INF deployment decision), Soviet propagandists began hammering away in the early 1980s at the alleged radical shift of Washington's policy onto a bellicose and confrontational course. "At the turn of the decade of the 1980s," a typical statement asserted, "the U.S. aggressive circles embarked on a course of open and direct antagonism, conducted a global offensive, a crusade, against socialism which is based on a carefully prepared complete program encompassing political, economic, ideological and military elements including the most radical measures; a policy of brinkmanship stressing a determination and readiness to engage in an open military confrontation with the Soviet Union."³

The main Soviet propaganda argument and the leitmotif of both the "campaign from above" and the "peace movement" was that the United States intended to attack the Soviet Union and that to avoid retaliation against its homeland, it was going to use INF deployed in Europe. (Despite the dubious logic of this argument, given the Soviets' own statements that a U.S. INF attack would be met by a retaliatory strike on the United States, it has not been totally without impact.) The consequences of this "nefarious" American ploy for Europe were then clearly spelled out. Acceptance of the INF by Western Europe would simply be "an invitation to suicide,"⁴ condemning its peoples to the role of "nuclear hostages" and subjecting them to a retaliatory nuclear strike that "may be terminal."⁵

The alleged U.S. desire to see Europe mainly as a "military bridgehead stuffed with nuclear weapons situated a long way from the United States but as close as possible to the socialist countries' vital centers" was declared to stem from a "disregard for the interests of other states including its own allies" which is "one of the principles of U.S. foreign policy."⁶ Washington was portrayed as attempting to

³ See *Razoruzhenie: Kto Protiv (Disarmament: Who Is Against It)*, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1983, p. 80.

⁴ *Pravda*, September 2, 1981.

⁵ See *Kanun dekabrya: Evropa pered viiborom (At the End of December Europe Is Facing a Choice)*, Progress Publishing House, Moscow, 1983, p. 26.

⁶ *Izvestiya*, April 11, 1983.

create an atmosphere that would facilitate the deployment by stirring up an anti-Soviet hysteria and inventing a Soviet military threat to Europe. Reagan's policies and the sanctions imposed after the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981, for instance, were interpreted by Moscow's propagandists as designed to blackmail "recalcitrant NATO partners" and overcome opposition to the Euro-missiles.⁷ Even the tragic fate of the Korean airliner shot down by the Soviets over Sakhalin in 1983 was promptly fitted into this propaganda framework: This "deliberate provocation" was allegedly concocted by the Reagan Administration to "reinforce the myth of the Soviet military threat, undermine the negotiations in Geneva, and neutralize the anti-nuclear movement."⁸

The campaign of vilification of the United States as a warmonger threatening the security of Western Europe was augmented by a particularly specious propaganda effort in response to President Reagan's decision to go ahead with production plans for the neutron bomb, which had been the target of a massive and largely successful Soviet campaign in 1978. On the day of the decision, a TASS commentary from Washington carried the tone of a shrill and orchestrated polemical offensive. This "criminal decision," it said, revealed the "cannibalistic instincts" of U.S. imperialism and aimed at the "total destruction of Europe and the Europeans."⁹

In the propaganda blitz that followed, much of it primarily for foreign consumption, Moscow's agitation specialists engaged in scare rhetoric and disinformation that had very little relationship to reality. The neutron bomb was said to be an ideal offensive weapon made to order for "aggressors, interventionists and terrorists."¹⁰ Moreover, these weapons were said to dramatically increase the threat to world

⁷ A detailed expose of this alleged U.S. campaign is found in Y. P. Davidov, "Washington's Anti-Polish Hysteria and Western Europe," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No. 5, April 1982, pp. 53-57.

⁸ *Ranun Dekabrya*, p. 29.

⁹ TASS, August 13, 1981. For a detailed analysis of the second neutron-bomb campaign, see "Moskaus Kampagne gegen Neutronenwaffen," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, October 5, 1981.

¹⁰ *New Times*, No. 34, September 1981.

peace, especially in Western Europe, since Washington intended to use them on "intermediate range missiles to be deployed in Europe as well as around the world with the Rapid Deployment Force and even in space."¹¹

Organically linked with the effort to present the United States as a threat to West European security were parallel attempts to portray it as inimical to vital European and particularly German political and economic interests. In the political realm, Washington was described as deeply worried by the growing political influence and prestige of Western Europe and determined to prevent any "emancipatory" tendencies among its allies and also to halt the further erosion of its influence. "I'm convinced," opined Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute for American Studies, "that Western Europe, particularly now, has overtaken the United States in terms of political potential."¹² Realizing that this major change in the "American patron/European client" relationship had taken place during the years of detente and economic cooperation, Washington was said to be striving to poison the international atmosphere, derail the policies of detente and international cooperation, and "bind Europe to its mindless pursuit of military superiority."¹³

The inter-alliance strife was said to be particularly pronounced between the United States and West Germany. The Federal Republic, according to the propaganda, had "ceased to be a political dwarf and horse-and-rider relations no longer accord in any way with its rank and potential."¹⁴ Furthermore, it had become a key political and economic actor, particularly with respect to relations with the socialist countries. "The state of relations between the FRG and the USSR has become a sensitive indicator of international detente and peaceful coexistence in Europe, and not only in Europe."¹⁵ The growing

¹¹ *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, October 5, 1981.

¹² G. A. Arbatov, "The Main Political Issue," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No. 10, October 1982, p. 3.

¹³ *Pravda*, January 6, 1982.

¹⁴ See A. Grigoryants, "Letter from Bonn: NATO Discord," *Izvestiya*, February 6, 1982.

¹⁵ I. D. Yefgrafov, "Uroki razryadki: vashington i vostochinaya politika frg" ("The Lessons of Detente: Washington and the Ostpolitik of the FRG"), *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No. 3, March 1983, p. 28.

international importance of West Germany and its realistic Ostpolitik were disliked across the Atlantic, it was said, because they served to "loosen discipline" and "undermine U.S. hegemony" in the NATO bloc--hence, the U.S. determination to torpedo detente as the "only possibility to occasion a radical shift in Ostpolitik."¹⁶

U.S. foreign and security policies in Europe were also presented by Moscow as inextricably linked to the interests of U.S. "capitalist monopolies" and designed to assure economic advantages for them at the expense of the Europeans. For example, the long-term increase of military expenditures decided on by the NATO countries in 1978 was interpreted as serving Washington's objective of "weakening the competitiveness of EEC,"¹⁷ while the imposition of U.S. sanctions following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland were seen as "undermining ... mutually beneficial economic ties between the Western European countries and the socialist countries" and "quite consciously counting on weakening the Western European countries' economic positions in comparison with the United States."¹⁸ A particularly blatant example of such disinformation tactics revealed an alleged "new Morgenthau plan" designed to put West Germany and the rest of Western Europe through a "lengthy period of bloodletting" by means of a deliberate policy of interest rate increases.¹⁹ The goal of this plan, like that of the old one, intimated the author, was "the radical removal of a rival for decades to come."²⁰

The basic message underlying the entire Soviet effort to present U.S. foreign and security policies as detrimental to the NATO community was that the only way for Western Europe to safeguard its vital security, political, and economic interests was to distance itself from the "corrupting influence of American power politics" and to undertake a renewed commitment to detente--a "divisible" detente, i.e., limited to

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁷ *Izvestiya*, September 9, 1981.

¹⁸ Y. P. Davidov, op. cit., p. 54.

¹⁹ V. Mikhailov, "The FRG and Peace in Europe," *International Affairs*, No. 1, 1982, p. 15.

²⁰ Ibid.

Europe, that would allow it to become an "island of peace" in which there would be no place for American INF.

THE PEACE OFFENSIVE

While one part of the "campaign from above" sought to depict the United States as the source of all evil and to achieve a degree of psychological decoupling of Western Europe from America, a parallel effort was launched to present the Soviets as a benign, peaceful, and compromise-ready security partner. This diplomatic and political "peace offensive" was aimed at influencing policymaking elites as well as public opinion in Western Europe. In pursuing propaganda strategies, Moscow enjoys a number of distinct advantages over a democratic regime. Since it is not responsible to any elected bodies or likely to be subject to any scrutiny or questioning of its policies, the regime is free to make various diplomatic moves and initiatives for purely propagandistic purposes. It is also free of public pressure and shifts in public opinion, factors that weigh heavily in Western decisionmaking.

The "peace offensive" strategy consisted essentially of advancing proposals, initiatives, pronouncements, and statements by various bodies and personalities that would lead to prevention of the INF deployments. The rationale of all of these activities rested on two basic premises, which remained constant throughout the campaign: (1) that the installation of Soviet SS-20s was simply an answer to already existing American forward-based systems (FBS) and thus ostensibly had a defensive character,²¹ and (2) that the balance of nuclear weapons between the two sides in Europe was nearly perfect and therefore Western deployments would be unnecessary and destabilizing. Curiously, this argument, which was first made in 1979, continued to be vigorously advanced some four years and 250 SS-20s later.

The vast array of proposals and initiatives articulated during the four years of the campaign were of four basic types:²²

²¹ In the words of Vadim Zagladin, deputy chief of the CPSU International Department: "I can assure you that if there are no American forward-based systems in Europe, we will have no need at all for medium-range missiles." (*Le Monde*, November 28, 1979.)

²² A useful analysis of the Soviet proposals from a somewhat different viewpoint is presented in "The Soviet Peace Offensive: An Analysis of Tactics," Radio Free Europe, *RFE/RL*, May 3, 1982, Munich.

- Unequal proposals
- Peripheral proposals
- Trial balloons
- Propaganda proposals

These four categories are by no means clearly delineated, and they often overlap; nevertheless, they are sufficiently different to warrant separate treatment.

The *unequal proposals* were more often than not seemingly new Soviet initiatives presented as a basis for negotiation and designed to create the impression of significant Soviet concessions. Packaged for achieving the greatest possible propagandistic impact, they invariably were vague and sketchy on matters of fact and detail. Their most characteristic feature and common denominator, however, was their one-sidedness. If acted upon, they would have inevitably resulted in preserving Soviet INF superiority and keeping the American systems out of Europe. These proposals included the following:

- An announcement by Brezhnev in East Berlin on October 6, 1979, that the Soviet Union was willing to reduce the number of "nuclear means" deployed in the Western parts of the country by an unspecified number if NATO would forgo deployment.²³
- A November 6, 1979, interview in *Pravda* in which Brezhnev proposed that INF negotiations could be started without delay if NATO would renounce the expected dual-track decision.
- A Soviet proposal presented during Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow in July 1980, in which the Soviets agreed to start bilateral INF talks with the United States if FBS were included and on the condition that any agreement reached would be carried out only after ratification of SALT II.²⁴

²³ Text of speech available in *Pravda*, October 7, 1979.

²⁴ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 4, 1980.

- A proposal in Brezhnev's keynote address at the 26th CPSU Congress for a moratorium on deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.²⁵
- Brezhnev's offer during his visit to the FRG on November 23, 1981, to unilaterally reduce SS-20s deployed in the European USSR if the United States would agree to a moratorium.²⁶
- A proposal by Andropov to reduce the Soviet SS-20 arsenal to the level of the combined British and French nuclear forces if NATO would cancel the Pershing II and GLCM deployments.²⁷

The *peripheral proposals* usually dealt with issues related but not central to INF concerns. They were aimed at weakening NATO cohesion and Western European solidarity, while pursuing stated Soviet objectives. The primary examples of this tactic were the Soviet initiatives advocating the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe. The first of these surfaced in a *Pravda* commentary in the fall of 1980, claiming that the United States intended to use Northern Europe in its aggressive plans and declaring Soviet willingness to cooperate in the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. This initiative, which received considerable attention, particularly on the part of some Scandinavian and German officials, including Olaf Palme and Egon Bahr, even included persistent, if nebulous, hints of Soviet willingness to include some of its own territory in a nuclear-free zone.²⁸ A similar move by Brezhnev in the summer of 1981, this one aimed at Italy, proposed an agreement "renouncing the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear Mediterranean states." Offers of specific agreements under which Moscow would obligate itself not to use nuclear weapons against Western European countries if the latter forbade nuclear deployments on

²⁵ *Pravda*, February 24, 1981.

²⁶ *The New York Times*, November 24, 1981.

²⁷ *Pravda*, December 22, 1981.

²⁸ For a detailed discussion, see "Soviet Shell Game: The Proposal for a Nuclear-Free Zone in Scandinavia," Radio Free Europe, *RFE/RL*, No. 299/81, July 30, 1981. Also see "Moskaus Friedensdruck auf Nordeuropa," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, July 7, 1981.

their territory were also made to Greece and the Scandinavian countries.²⁹ In practical terms, such offers were meaningless, since no INF deployments had been contemplated for these countries, but they were nonetheless important to Moscow because of their expected psychological decoupling impact. Soviet proposals were also put forth to expand the European zone subject to confidence-building measures, and there was an alleged Soviet plan for a "European option" for the settlement of the INF issue.

Trial balloons are usually launched by the Soviets in the form of unofficial statements, articles, or messages by Soviet officials. They are designed for foreign consumption, even when they appear in the Soviet media. Very few trial balloons are indicative of actual Soviet attitudes or policy evolution. As a rule, their objectives are to test Western public and official reaction, to stir media and public interest, to encourage conflicting Western interpretations of Soviet intentions, to lead to speculation about divergent views within the Soviet leadership, and, if possible, to induce Western preemptive concessions. For instance, in September 1981, *Pravda* claimed that the Soviet Union was prepared for "considerable" reductions in intermediate missiles prior to the start of the negotiations.³⁰ In another example, a month after Moscow had officially rejected Reagan's "zero option" as a propaganda ploy, a key Soviet official told a Western correspondent that the Soviet Union was in principle prepared to discuss a "zero option."³¹ The same official later told a West German parliamentarian that Moscow had stopped deploying SS-20s targeted at Western Europe, a claim flatly rejected by Western intelligence at the time. Another well-known Soviet official made the same claim to a West German seminar in March 1982. The above-mentioned alleged Soviet offer of a "European option" also had all the characteristics of a trial balloon.³²

²⁹ See *Pravda*, April 4, June 10, and June 27, 1981.

³⁰ *Pravda*, September 15, 1981.

³¹ Interview with Vadim Zagladin in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, December 15, 1981.

³² *Agence France Presse*, March 4, 1982.

Proposals of the fourth type involve the articulation and advancement in a variety of forums of a wide assortment of peace, security, and disarmament initiatives--some old, some new--that have no prospects of being taken into consideration, let alone leading to negotiations. Their sole purpose in the anti-INF campaign was to portray the Soviet government as genuinely peace-loving, concerned, and always willing to negotiate. Among the plethora of propaganda proposals in the "peace offensive" were initiatives to conclude nonaggression pacts between the Soviet bloc and the Western nations and then disband both alliances; to negotiate a worldwide peace treaty; to ban the development of new weapons; to impose reductions on military budgets; and to carry out an international scientific investigation of possible consequences of nuclear war.

While the "peace offensive" of the anti-INF campaign was generally intended to contrast the peace-loving, reasonable, and compromise-seeking Soviet Union to a bellicose and aggressive United States, the practice of using veiled, and not-so-veiled threats of dire consequences to the Europeans in the event of INF deployments was an integral part of it from the very beginning. Those threats were of both a military and a political nature.

The military threats consisted essentially of a more forceful reiteration of the argument that the installation of INF would transform the countries of Western Europe into American *places d'armes* facing inevitable nuclear retaliation. Such retaliation, considering Western Europe's "limited territory, population density and tremendous concentration of arms and troops ... [could] only result into turning it into a lifeless desert."³³ Thus Europe was likely to be the ultimate loser, even under the U.S. "war-winning" scenario. A more serious, albeit subtle threat was implicit in Soviet hints of the possibility of a preemptive Soviet first strike against INF host nations. The Soviet propaganda pamphlet, *The Threat to Europe*, suggested that by deploying the INF, the United States intended to involve its European allies in

³³ V. Mikhailov, "The FRG and Peace in Europe," *International Affairs*, No. 1, January 1982. There were virtually scores of similar explicit threats during the campaign.

confrontations with the Soviet Union even away from the continent. Given the first-strike nature of these weapons, the pamphlet implied, in such a contingency, the Soviets might have no choice but to preempt.³⁴ The likelihood of Soviet nuclear preemption was also discussed in an article by Georgi Arbatov in the party theoretical organ, *KOMMUNIST*.³⁵ Also in the category of military threats were persistent Soviet warnings of countermeasures to INF deployments. Such threats remained vague until October 1983, when the Soviet Defense Ministry announced plans to deploy tactical nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe.³⁶ These "counterdeployments," however, were, in the opinion of most Western analysts, planned before the INF decision was even reached, to replace the obsolete SCUD and FROG-7 missiles. They did not represent a qualitatively new threat.

More significant than the crude threats of military consequences that would result from INF deployment were the Soviet warnings of serious political consequences. These warnings were worded to create the impression that West German relations with the East would be irreparably damaged by INF and a new period of high tensions and danger would be ushered in. "It is an illusion to believe," according to *Pravda*, "that relations between East and West could be again normalized after the deployment of the missiles. It will be a different Europe with the Pershings and the Cruise Missiles."³⁷ In the summer of 1981, Moscow began intimating that the INF deployments would constitute a breach of the Moscow Treaty of 1970, the cornerstone of German

³⁴ *The Threat to Europe*, p. 26.

³⁵ Georgi Arbatov, "The Strategy of Nuclear Madness," *KOMMUNIST*, No. 6, April 1981.

³⁶ The "tactical-operational" missiles the Soviets are deploying are the SS-21 and SS-23. Both of them are mobile and dual-capable, with a range of 125 and 500 kilometers, respectively, and armed with a single warhead in their nuclear variant. The warhead yield is presumed to be around 200 kilotons. Of much greater political and military significance is the SS-22, a modernized version of the SS-12 (SCALEBOARD) which has a range of up to 1,000 kilometers and a yield of 500 kilotons. For a more detailed discussion, see "The Counter-deployments in Eastern Europe: Military and Political Implications," Radio Free Europe, *RFE-RL*, No. 32/84, January 18, 1984.

³⁷ Cited in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 13, 1981.

Ostpolitik.³⁸ This, of course, implied that deployments were likely to also endanger the major achievement of Ostpolitik--the normalization of the Berlin situation. Knowing the sensitivity of most Germans to the issue of inter-German relations and their desire to preserve the gains that have been achieved in this area, the Soviets and their East German allies persistently warned Bonn that relations would worsen dramatically if the INF decision was carried out. East German party boss Honecker spoke of the coming of a new "ice age" in inter-German relations, while other propagandists hinted that humanitarian measures such as the reunification of families or the buying out of East German political prisoners were likely to be terminated.³⁹

What the Soviets expected to gain by infusing the "peace offensive" with a dimension of threat and intimidation is not clear. Indeed, in many cases the threats seemed to be counterproductive to the overriding Soviet objectives. For example, Soviet hints at preemptive nuclear strikes directly contradicted Moscow's guarantees that it would never use nuclear weapons first. In another example, a Soviet threat that Norway and Denmark could face nuclear attack if they did not join a Nordic nuclear-free zone ran counter to Soviet assurances that it would not, under any circumstances, use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states.⁴⁰ Soviet officials may have hoped that such tactics would encourage people in Germany and elsewhere who feared the collapse of detente and Ostpolitik more than they feared the Soviet military threat to take an anti-INF stand.

³⁸ See Rudolf Dolzer, "Die 'Pravda' und die NATO-Nachrüstung: Ein Bruch des Moskauer Vertrages?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 14, 1981. Interestingly enough, the East Germans have even claimed that INF stationing represents a breach of the Potsdam Agreement. See *Neues Deutschland*, September 22, 1983.

³⁹ *Deutsche Presse Agentur*, October 17, 1983.

⁴⁰ This threat was made in an interview with the Finnish news agency by Lev Voronkov, department chief of the USSR's Institute for World Economy and International Relations. See "The Soviet Peace Offensive: A Chronology," *Radio Liberty Research*, May 4, 1982.

IV. THE CAMPAIGN FROM BELOW

It is not unusual for Soviet foreign political campaign efforts aimed at decisionmakers and important members of the establishment to be paralleled by equal, and at times much more vigorous, attempts to gain influence and leverage among politically active groups and popular movements. The traditional objective of such efforts is the exploitation of popular and often legitimate concerns for Soviet purposes. The INF case appeared particularly susceptible to such a "campaign from below." In the preceding decade, some Western democratic societies and political processes had been significantly affected by popular disaffection and organized protest. The growing impact of organized popular movements in the West, exemplified by the anti-Vietnam War movement in the United States and Western Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s, was taken into account by the Kremlin. Brezhnev was undoubtedly referring to the success of these movements when he stated in 1975:

One can say with confidence that the present changes in the world situation are largely the result of the activities of public forces, of the hitherto unparalleled activity of the people, who are displaying sharp intolerance of arbitrary rule and aggression and an unbending will for peace.¹

In the late 1970s, Soviet optimism regarding the utility of carefully organized campaigns in Western societies was further reinforced by the success of the neutron-bomb campaign in West Germany; Soviet propagandists announced that President Carter was forced to abandon his plans "chiefly because of the European public protests."² At the same time, the growing political disaffection in Europe was accompanied by widespread disillusionment and the rejection of many basic precepts and norms of Western industrial societies by vocal,

¹ Cited in J. A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement," *Problems of Communism*, November-December, 1982.

² Col. M. Ponomarev, "Military-Political Review: United States Trampling on Its Partners," *Krasnaya zvezda*, September 7, 1981.

politically active minorities. Numerous movements developed around ecological, feminist, anti-nuclear, and other issues that encouraged pacifist and neutralist tendencies in society.

These trends were observed in most Western countries, but they were particularly pronounced in West Germany. Although a detailed examination of the reasons for this situation is beyond the scope of this Note, we can describe some of the more important factors. To begin with, West Germany had a far greater commitment to detente and Ostpolitik than did the other European powers, which led to greater disillusionment over the collapse of detente and an unfortunate tendency to look for and find the culprits in the West and in the United States, rather than in Moscow. This disillusionment, coupled with West German nuclear sensitivities, the strong anti-militaristic sentiments of the younger generation, and residual guilt feelings from the Nazi era, combined to create an atmosphere of acute perceived insecurity and a reluctance to accord legitimacy to NATO defense measures. Such attitudes encouraged and in turn were reenforced by a noticeable rise of anti-Americanism, which had been present only in a latent form heretofore, but which now became a common denominator in the peace movement and among most intellectuals as well.³ Political trends in the Federal Republic at the turn of the decade of the 1970s thus seemed propitious for Soviet penetration and manipulation. The mechanics, tactics, and specific activities of this Soviet effort are analyzed below.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND INSTRUMENTALITIES

One of the decisive advantages of Soviet "campaigning" is the fact that most of the necessary organizational framework is already in place before the campaign begins. This framework usually consists of a central steering authority in Moscow; an elaborate network of international front organizations, most of which have their own branch organizations at the national level in the target country; and the

³ For a perceptive analysis of the remarkable shift in attitudes toward America among German and French intellectuals in the 1980s, see John Vinocur, "Intellectual Europe Changes Sides on U.S. as Hero or Ogre," *The New York Times*, May 16, 1984.

entire infrastructure of communist and communist-controlled organizations.

The key decisions regarding a campaign are almost certainly made at the very top of the Soviet political hierarchy--the politburo or the Defense Council.⁴ The strategy and tactics for the campaign are then formulated in the International Relations Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which has been presided over for some 30 years by Boris Ponomarev.⁵ This department, the most important coordinating organ of Soviet foreign political activities, is assisted by the International Information Department, which is responsible for foreign political propaganda, and Service A of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the KGB, whose charter is disinformation, forgeries, and covert operations in support of foreign political objectives.⁶ Little is known about the specific activities of these command organs, but the role played by the major Soviet front organizations is more transparent. The most important front organizations in the INF campaign were the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), and the Christian Peace Conference (CPC).

Major Soviet Front Organizations

The World Peace Council. The WPC, perhaps the best-known and well-organized of the Soviet fronts, was founded in 1949 and currently has

⁴ According to Defense Intelligence Agency analysts, the Defense Council is the top decisionmaking body in INF "active-measures" matters. See Wynfred Joshua, "Soviet Manipulation of the European Peace Movement," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1983.

⁵ For details on the International Relations Department, see John J. Dziak, "Soviet Perceptions of Military Power," National Strategy Information Center, 1982; also see Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR*, The Rand Corporation, R-2869, September 1982.

⁶ Apart from Ponomarev, the two most important people in Soviet "campaigning" are Ponomarev's first deputy, Vadim Zagladin, who is in charge of nonruling communist parties and, according to Soviet ex-KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko, the moving force behind Soviet "active measures" in Europe, and Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the International Department and at the same time chairman of the Soviet-FRG Friendship Society. See *Der Spiegel*, No. 7, February 14, 1983. On the International Information Department, see Dzirkals, Gustafson, and Johnson, op. cit.

over 137 affiliates around the world.⁷ The WPC has twice been expelled from Western countries because of espionage and subversive activities--from Paris in 1951 and from Vienna in 1957. Headquartered in Helsinki, its nominal president is an Indian communist, Ramesh Chandra, though its de facto leader is Vitaly Shaposhnikov, a member of the WPC presidium and also Ponomarev's deputy in the International Department in charge of International Social Organizations, i.e., Soviet fronts. The WPC is subsidized directly by Moscow and is engaged in a wide array of anti-Western activities. In the words of its president:

It is the most powerful, representative and largest international solidarity movement of our time. There is no liberation struggle, no struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and racial discrimination in which the World Peace Council does not play an important role.⁸

The WPC's most pronounced role in Western Europe is in the mobilization of "men and women from different political orientations in their struggle for better understanding and cooperation for peace" and the coordination of mass organizations' activities. The WPC-organized New Stockholm Appeal presented 700 million signatures to the first special United Nations session on disarmament in 1978. As far back as 1973, the "World Congress of Peace Forces" in Moscow set the tone programatically for the strategy of "popular front" coalitions that was later pursued in the neutron-bomb and INF campaigns.⁹ The specific involvement of the WPC in Germany, though indirect and concealed in the activities of its West German branch, the "German Peace Union" (Deutsche Friedens Union), was decisive and multifaceted.

⁷ For a detailed description of WPC organizational structures and activities, see Helmut Baerwald, *Missbrauchte Friedenssehnsucht*, Osang Verlag, Bonn, 1983, pp. 49-60. In 1979, as part of a Soviet effort to encourage a peace movement in America, a "U.S. Peace Council" was organized under WPC auspices. It was said to be particularly important because it showed other peace organizations "how to break the chains of anti-Soviet prejudices." (*Problems of Peace and Socialism*, No. 11, 1982.)

⁸ Cited in Ortwin Buchbender, et al., *Sicherheit und Frieden*, E. S. Mittler and Sohn Verlag, Herford, 1983, p. 368.

⁹ Ibid.

The World Federation of Trade Unions. The WFTU, one of the oldest Soviet fronts, was founded in 1945. It is based in Prague and claims 206 million members in 90 national organizations.¹⁰ Since the late 1970s, particularly since its 1978 Congress in Prague, the WFTU has made the "struggle for peace and disarmament" its major priority. An International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament was set up in 1981 with the specific purpose of influencing and infiltrating Western noncommunist unions, an effort that became pronounced during the INF campaign. Under its auspices, some 1,000 trade union delegations journey to the Soviet Union each year, while 800 Soviet delegations are sent abroad.¹¹

The Christian Peace Conference. The CPC, founded in 1958 and located in Prague, has local affiliates in 80 countries. The CPC gained considerable importance among Soviet fronts during the INF campaign due to the important role played by Western churches in the broad-based peace movement in Europe. Its propaganda activities have been assisted by a new Soviet "Committee for Relations with Foreign Religious Groups Working for Peace" set up by the International Department under the chairmanship of Soviet propagandist Metropolitan Filaret and presented as an independent body of concerned churchmen.¹²

The CPC is assisted in West Germany by the Berlin Conference of European Catholics, whose president is a member of the WPC presidium.

Other Soviet Fronts

Other well-known fronts that played a role in the campaign are the World Federation of Scientific Workers, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the International Democratic Federation, the International Organization of Journalists, and the World Federation of Democratic Youth.¹³ These fronts are estimated to cost the Soviets \$63

¹⁰ See Genady Nikolaev, "The World of Labour for a World at Peace," Special Supplement to *New Times*, Moscow, 1982, p. 14.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² *The Economist Foreign Report*, February 2, 1984, p. 4.

¹³ For a list of all Soviet fronts, see Richard F. Staar, "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1982.

million a year, a conservative figure which does not include the costs of active participation in specific campaigns.¹⁴

THE DKP AND ITS ALLIES

Subordinated to the Soviet front organizations and serving as their "transmission belts" are numerous West German communist and communist-controlled organizations. The most important of these by far is the German Communist Party (DKP). Originally founded in 1918 as the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), it was outlawed by Hitler's regime in 1933 and was reconstituted in 1945. It was judged subversive and unconstitutional by a federal court and was outlawed again in 1956. Finally, it was reestablished under its present name in April 1969. As an autonomous part of the legitimate West German political landscape, the DKP is a negligible factor. It has a membership of about 44,000 and has seldom been able to attract more than a minute percentage of the electorate (0.2 percent in the 1983 election).¹⁵ Its importance stems almost exclusively from its complete subservience to the Soviet Union and the East German Communist Party (SED) and its ability, through its superior organization, discipline, and professionalism, to influence leftist political forces in the FRG. The DKP organizational structure consists of a party center in Dusseldorf, 12 regional and 200 district bureaus, a party school, a political foundation, and a research institute.¹⁶ The party as a whole is controlled and financed (to the tune of some 60 million DM) by the East German SED--more specifically,

¹⁴ See "CIA Study: Soviet Action and Propaganda," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., February 6 and 19, 1980, p. 79. The Soviets admit that the WPC and other organizations' activities are funded through the auspices of the Soviet Peace Committee. The chairman of this committee, Yuri Zhukov, has claimed that 80 million Soviet citizens contribute to the "Soviet Peace Fund." A *Pravda* article of May 1982 revealed that Soviet citizens work without pay one day a week, donating their wages to the "peace fund," but this is likely to be a propaganda statement. See *Pravda*, May 31, 1982.

¹⁵ For details, see *Bundesverfassungschutzbericht*, 1983, Bonn, April 1984.

¹⁶ See Baerwald, op. cit., p.86.

by the "Department West" of the central committee of the SED.¹⁷ Apart from its direct involvement in the peace movement, which includes the full-time activities of some 400 highly trained professionals, the DKP has influenced the movement primarily by orchestrating and directing the involvement of a large number of front organizations with a combined membership of about 90,000, which played a key role in the anti-INF campaign.¹⁸

There are two types of DKP fronts: direct subsidiary organizations and organizations that are strongly influenced or controlled by the DKP. The most important subsidiary organizations are the German Socialist Working Youth (SDAJ), the Marxist Student Association Spartacus (MSB), and the Young Pioneers.

DKP Direct Subsidiary Organizations

German Socialist Working Youth. The SDAJ, founded in 1968, currently has about 15,000 members, 40 percent of whom (including most of the leaders) are also DKP members.¹⁹ Its activities are focused on young people, especially in the labor unions. The SDAJ is a member of the Soviet "World Federation of Democratic Youth."

Marxist Student Association Spartacus. The MSB was founded in 1970 to carry out communist propaganda and organizational work among West German university students. It has 6,000 members, 70 percent of

¹⁷ The actual transfer of funds is accomplished either through secret couriers or through East German-owned companies in the FRG. Apart from subsidizing the DKP, the East German SED directly supervises most of the training and indoctrination of West German cadres. Some 3,000 DKP functionaries, for instance, have graduated from the party academy "Franz Mehring" in East Berlin, which trains only West German cadres. Also subject to indoctrination and recruitment are the thousands of FRG citizens who visit the GDR as part of DKP-organized delegations. In 1982, for example, 800 West German delegations with some 10,000 members visited East Germany, while 4,000 children spent their vacations in camps under the auspices of the SED youth organization. For details see "Die DKP und die SED sind Bruderparteien," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 20, 1982; "Die Firmen der SED sind die Bankschalter der DKP," *Die Welt*, November 2, 1983; and *Bundesverfassungsschutzbericht*, 1983.

¹⁸ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 9, 1982.

¹⁹ Baerwald, op. cit., p. 88.

whom are DKP members. It is also an institutional member of the Soviet "International Student Federation."

The Young Pioneers. Founded in 1974 and ostensibly a children's organization, the Young Pioneers organization is controlled by DKP functionaries and has 3,500 members.

DKP-Controlled Organizations

Among fronts of the second type, DKP-controlled organizations, a particularly active role in the peace movement was played by the German Peace Union (DFU), the Committee for Peace, Disarmament, and Cooperation (KFAZ), the German Peace Society-United Military Service Opponents (DVG-VKG), the Association of People Persecuted by the Nazi Regime-Union of Anti-Fascists (VVN-BDA), and the Christians for Disarmament (CfA).

The German Peace Union. The DFU is a branch of the World Peace Council, set up in 1960 as an umbrella organization to coordinate the activities of "peace-loving" forces in the FRG. About one-third of its membership consists of leading functionaries of the DKP and other communist organizations. The DFU acted as a sponsor of some of the most important initiatives of the anti-INF "campaign from below," including the so-called "Krefeld Appeal."²⁰

The Committee for Peace, Disarmament, and Cooperation. KFAZ, founded as another umbrella organization in April 1974, has become the leading organizer and guiding force in peace-movement demonstrations and activities. It does not possess a formal organizational structure or by-laws, but is guided by a coordinating bureau dominated by communists and their sympathizers who are not elected, but appointed by consensus. It has been particularly active in carrying out the guidelines of the WPC, of which it is a leading regional affiliate.

German Peace Society-United Military Service Opponents. This front was also organized in 1974. With about 22,000 members, it is the largest of the DKP-controlled organizations. About one-third of its presidium is made up of communist and KFAZ officials.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 92-93. The Krefeld Appeal is described later in this section.

Association of People Persecuted by the Nazi Regime-Union of Anti-Fascists. The VVN-BDA is one of the oldest communist fronts, having been set up directly by the Soviet Union in East Berlin in February 1947. It is dominated by communists, but its members include social democrats and trade unionists as well. The VVN-BDA is an institutional member of the WPC.

Christians for Disarmament. The CfA was organized under the auspices of the Soviet "Christian Peace Conference and World Peace Council" in 1977. The group has the task of infiltrating and exploiting the religious segments of the peace movement. Organizationally, it is under the jurisdiction of the German Peace Union, and it has been particularly active in the evangelical church.

Other Groups

A great number of lesser-known groups also assisted in the anti-INF campaign, including the Democratic Women's Initiative, the Association of Democratic Jurists, and the Union of Democratic Scientists. All of these organizations are German branches of the respective Soviet international fronts.

In West Germany there are 13 active DKP-affiliated organizations with 27,000 members and 50 DKP-controlled groups with an estimated 70,000 members.²¹ The campaign was also assisted by the numerous "Societies for Friendship" with Soviet bloc countries. An important propaganda role was played by the "Generals for Peace and Disarmament," a group of former high-ranking NATO officers which claims to be independent but is essentially a tool of the WPC. (Three of its members belong to the WPC and one, General Costa Gomes of Portugal, is even a WPC Vice President.²²)

²¹ See Gerd Langguth, *Protestbewegung*, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln, 1983, p. 58. This book is easily the best single source of information on the origins, evolution, and political tendencies of the various West German protest movements of the left.

²² The idea for this group reportedly originated at a 1980 congress of the WPC in Sofia. The group was set up in April 1981 with the help of

The policies and initiatives of the pro-Soviet front are promoted and assisted by a media and print propaganda apparatus that produces an astounding volume of materials. In 1983, the DKP controlled 14 publishing houses and 30 book dealerships under an umbrella organization called the Working Group of Socialist and Democratic Publishers and Book Dealers. This organization published 3 daily, 61 monthly, 47 bimonthly, and 1,404 quarterly publications, with a total output of 37.5 million items. In the same year, the group produced over 500 new book titles of its own and distributed about 1,000 East German and Soviet titles. A film distribution agency and a recording company also work full-time in the agitation and propaganda campaign. The large democratic parties do not have anything that even approaches the size and sophistication of this DKP propaganda apparatus.²³

A direct and important, albeit less well-known, role is played by the KGB, with its traditional expertise in disinformation, subversion, and recruitment of agents of influence. A recent report on security by the Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesverfassungsschutz*) indicated that the number of KGB agents among Soviet diplomatic officials increased considerably in the early 1980s, so that

a Dutch peace research center and the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, headed by retired U.S. Admiral Gene La Rocque. Initially, it was administered in West Berlin by Gerhard Kade, a veteran WPC official and a vice-president of the WPC research organization, the International Institute for Peace. In 1983, the leadership role was taken over by retired British Brigadier Michael Harbottle. Among the group's most important propaganda contributions are the publication of a starkly pro-Soviet book entitled *Generals for Peace* (published by the DKP publishing house Pahl-Rugenstein in Cologne) and a "Memorandum" to the UN Special Session on Disarmament in the summer of 1982. The activities of the "peace" generals collectively and individually have had considerable propagandistic impact in the peace movement, confirming the advice given to a Comintern congress in 1938 by its then-Secretary-General Georgi Dimitrov: "One sympathizer is worth more than a dozen militant communists. A writer of reputation or a retired general are worth more than 500 poor devils who won't know any better than to get themselves beaten up by the police." See Baerwald, op. cit., pp. 60-64; *The Daily Telegraph*, October 31, 1984; and *Die Welt*, November 1, 1984.

²³ For a detailed account of DKP-controlled publishing activities, see Wilhelm Mensing, *Maulwuerfe in Kulturbeet*, Edition Interform, Osnabrueck, 1983, pp. 109-137. Also see *Bundesverfassungsschutzbericht*, 1983, pp. 58-60.

by now more than half of the Soviet diplomatic officials are KGB. Nearly 500 Soviet and Eastern European intelligence officers, plus some 2,300 East German agents, are reportedly operating in the FRG.²⁴ Direct involvement in the peace movement in support of DKP activities is said to be one of the KGB's main tasks at present. At least one Soviet agent has already been expelled from Germany for trying to recruit agents to influence the anti-nuclear movement.²⁵ KGB officers have also been expelled from Norway, Denmark, and Holland for similar activities.²⁶

In the "campaign from below," the KGB engaged in skillful disinformation activities designed to enhance distrust in the United States. In late 1981, for instance, a forgery containing an alleged U.S. plan for nuclear strikes in Western Europe in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, entitled "Holocaust Again for Europe," was circulated among peace groups.²⁷ It has also been alleged that Soviet intelligence is actively supporting and trying to manipulate extremist groups on both sides of the political spectrum, including the Red Army Faction and the neo-Nazis, to encourage polarization and political instability in the FRG.²⁸

Finally, Moscow exerts a direct influence on the West German political scene through the federation of FRG-USSR friendship societies which presently coordinates the work of 13 regional affiliates.²⁹

²⁴ "KGB Offiziere auf Friedenskundgebungen der DKP," *Die Welt am Sonntag*, June 26, 1983.

²⁵ See "Expulsion of Soviets Worldwide, 1983," *The Foreign Affairs Note*, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., January 1984.

²⁶ *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, November 28, 1981; and *Aftenposten*, June 24, 1983.

²⁷ *U.S. News and World Report*, January 11, 1982.

²⁸ Such allegations were made, for example, by the chief of the department for State Protection of the Federal Criminal Office (Bundeskriminalamt--BKA), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 20, 1982. Earlier, West German security officials alleged that terrorist groups such as the radical left Red Army Faction and the neo-Nazi Defense Sport Group Hoffmann had received training and support from Soviet clients in South Yemen and the Palestine Liberation Organization. See *International Herald Tribune*, May 29, 1981.

²⁹ *Bundesverfassungschutz*, 1983.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF PENETRATION

While the Soviet Union and its allies possessed the requisite organizational infrastructure to conduct the "campaign from below," they needed to overcome two critical weaknesses. First, despite its organizational sophistication and ample financing, the infrastructure was numerically weak and could hardly hope to mount a significant effort on its own. Second, many of the potential opponents of INF who were the natural targets of the campaign were not likely to welcome direct Soviet or communist sponsorship. The solution to this dilemma was a popular-front strategy that would allow the Soviet-sponsored elements to infiltrate, coopt, and exploit the peace movement while remaining largely in the background. This strategy, usually carried out by the Comintern, has been a key part of the Soviet foreign political arsenal since the very beginnings of the Soviet state. A high-ranking Comintern functionary, Dmitry Manuilskiy, provided the following succinct description of the strategy at the 7th Comintern Congress in 1935:

The proletariat in all countries, supported by the Soviet Union, has to build the broadest possible popular front for the anti-war struggle and bring the masses together in a unified front against the warmongers. But this requires the communists to switch from the old primitive methods of short-term, isolated anti-war campaigns to a strategy of a broad, coordinated struggle for peace, which--based on the peace-promoting policies of the Soviet Union--would incorporate all anti-war forces at the national and international level and include the most diverse forms of action such as street demonstrations, parliamentary actions, international conferences of workers' organizations, and the creation of a wide network of anti-war organizations, etc. It is no longer sufficient at present to fight for peace with the obsolete weapon of small campaigns, since the communists are already capable of using the heavy artillery of the broadest mass movements against the danger of imperialist war.³⁰

The popular-front strategy was articulated openly at the very beginning of the campaign in late 1979 at a Conference of Soviet Peace Champions in Moscow. It became the major focus of WPC activities leading up to the convening of a "World Parliament of Peoples for Peace"

³⁰ Cited in Baerwald, op. cit., pp. 116-117.

in Bulgaria in September 1980, where the need to "create a worldwide anti-war front, able to materialize the anxiety of hundreds of millions of people in mass actions to prevent war" was emphasized, and an action program for 1981 was adopted which underlined "the urgency of bringing together in common mass actions, people belonging to different political parties and tendencies."³¹

It was particularly important for the Soviets to utilize the opportunities presenting themselves through the "anti-war positions of socialist and social-democratic parties and other mass organizations."³² Indeed, throughout the campaign in West Germany, an effort was expanded to bring about the widest possible programmatical and practical cooperation with the left wing of the German Social Democratic Party and its youth organization.³³ A similar strategy was pursued toward the Green party, which emerged as one of the more important forces in the peace movement. During the initial emergence of the Greens as an organized, political force, both the Soviets and the West German communists were extremely critical and dismissed them as "utopians" and "political charlatans."³⁴ Yet once the Soviet campaign against INF started and the key role of the Greens was recognized, both the West German communists and the Soviets promptly discovered their "progressive orientation on a number of issues" and "began doing everything to strengthen the anti-militarist positions of the Greens and consolidate the new party's links with the mass anti-war movement."³⁵ Strengthening the anti-militarist positions has apparently involved efforts to infiltrate the Greens' organization and influence its course from

³¹ *XX Century and Peace*, November-December, 1980, cited in J. A. Vermaat, *Moscow Fronts*, p. 6.

³² "Communique of the Conference on Ideology of the Ruling Communist Parties," *Pravda*, November 4, 1981.

³³ An insightful analysis of SPD attitudes toward INF will be published in a forthcoming Rand report by John Van Oudenaren on nuclear policy in the Federal Republic of Germany.

³⁴ A. S. Pokh and A. B. Trukin, "The Green Party in the Political Arena of the FRG," *Rabochiy klass i sovremenii mir*, No. 3, May-June 1983, translated in JPRS 84530, No. 1466, October 13, 1983, p. 74.

³⁵ Ibid. Also see Y. G. Kyuchik, "The Greens: The Present-Day Protest by the Middle Strata," *Sovetskoye consuparstvo i pravo*, No. 11, November 1983, translated in JPRS-UPS-84-006-L, February 15, 1984.

within. According to the Hamburg branch of the Federal Agency for Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesverfassungschutz*), the leadership of the Greens in Hamburg by mid-1982 was dominated by communist-oriented elements.³⁶ A number of communist functionaries have also been identified among the Greens' leadership in West Berlin and Wiesbaden.³⁷ This is not to say that the DKP has been able to control or manipulate the Greens at will. On a number of occasions, Greens leaders and organizations have taken issue with the blatantly pro-Moscow course of communist-controlled elements. Nonetheless, the Greens' anti-INF and anti-American attitudes were so dominant that anti-Soviet criticisms remained muted and the campaign in general was remarkably one-sided.³⁸

The Soviet-controlled elements in West Germany sought to build and promote the popular front by emphasizing the areas of agreement between the various participants of the peace movement; these efforts usually consisted only of expressing opposition to INF and disregarding or minimizing the many issues of ideological, political, and tactical disagreement--a strategy that came to be known as "minimal consensus" (*Minimalkonsensus*).

Church-oriented groups in the German peace movement became the focus of particular attention in Soviet efforts to put together a viable anti-INF coalition. Realizing the crucial role played by churches and believers, the Soviets began advocating a strategy of "broad contacts and joint actions," through which they hoped that the "mass of believers could become an active force for the anti-imperialist struggle and profound social change."³⁹ In the process of encouraging such "joint

³⁶ See Joachim Wagner, "Wer von linksausen beeinflusst in Hamburg die Grunen?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 16, 1982.

³⁷ A detailed account of the attempted penetration of the Greens by communist elements is found in Jean-Paul Picaper, "Vers le IVE Reich," *Le Table Ronde*, Paris, 1983.

³⁸ A Soviet observer has noted approvingly that for the Greens in general the cold war question, "What are we going to do if the Russians come?" is now being supplemented by the urgent question, "What are we going to do if the Americans stay?" See L. Istiyagin, "Dominant in the Antiwar Struggle," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye ofnosheniga*, No. 10, October 1983, p. 134.

³⁹ N. Kovalskiy, "Averting the Threat: Believers Are Also in the Ranks of the Anti-War Movement," *Pravda*, April 26, 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 83624, June 7, 1983, p. 23. For the role of the churches in the anti-INF campaign, see Van Oudenaren (forthcoming).

actions," Soviet propagandists skillfully appealed to the pacifist leanings of some of the believers. Though pacifism has been traditionally condemned by Marxist-Leninist theoreticians as utopian, unscientific, and harmful, it has consistently been used to demoralize and undermine the defense will of Soviet adversaries abroad. This imperative was expressed by Lenin in a terse admonition to foreign minister Chicherin prior to the Geneva conference in 1922:

We communists have our communist program (the Third International); but we still consider it to be our duty to support (even if the odds are 10,000 to 1) pacifists in the other, i.e., bourgeois, camp.... This will both have bite and be "polite" and help demoralize the enemy.⁴⁰

The actual task of coopting religious members of the pacifist peace movement was entrusted to an organization controlled by the German Peace Union and created specifically for this purpose, the Christians for Disarmament (CfA), and the DKP front KFAZ, which is particularly active in the mobilization of noncommunists. Thanks to their efforts, the DKP and its proxies were able to infiltrate and achieve a remarkable degree of cooperation with the two largest Christian peace organizations active in the peace movement, Action Reconciliation Peace Services (*Aktiongemeinschaft Dienst fuer den Frieden*, AGDF), and the Catholic Initiative Church from Below (*Initiative Kirche von Unten*, IKVU), both of which strongly supported the communist-initiated Krefeld Appeal.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Cited in J. A. Emerson Vermaat, *Soviet Fronts*. Pacifism remains, however, a commodity strictly for foreign consumption and is vigorously combatted at home. Thus, an authoritative (unsigned) article in *Pravda* on November 6, 1981, took issue with alleged failures of the ideological apparatus to combat pacifist sentiments among the Soviet population and admonished that "our propaganda must decisively rid itself of the traces of pacifism that are occasionally to be found in some instructional or propaganda materials." There have also been strong attacks against pacifism in the East European countries that seem to be more susceptible to it. See, for instance, "Youth Daily Attacks Pacifism in GDR, Hungary," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *FBIS-EEU*, No. 226, November 22, 1983.

⁴¹ *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit*, p. 8; and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 11, 1982.

The success of the popular front strategy also depended importantly on securing the greatest possible cooperation from the politically powerful German trade unions, and a considerable effort was expended toward that end. The German Trade Union Organization (*Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund*, DGB), incorporating 17 independent unions with 7.9 million members, is one of the strongest political forces in the country. The West German trade unions were a target of penetration for the communist party (70 percent of the party members belong to unions) long before the anti-INF campaign,⁴² but infiltration efforts were greatly expanded during the campaign. The professed objective was a "progressive alliance of working people" against NATO's INF deployment. In several cases, the DKP was able to bring about a tactical alliance with individual unions, some of which--the Union of Metal Workers (I.G. Metal), the Union of Printing Workers (I.G. Druck und Papier), and the Union of Bank, Trade, and Insurance employees--came out openly against the INF deployments.⁴³ In other instances, joint DKP and trade-union protest demonstrations were organized.⁴⁴ Overall, though the DKP and its allies were never able to coopt the union movement for their purposes, as the campaign intensified there was a noticeable shift to the left in DGB attitudes, prompting a member of the presidium of the DGB to exclaim:

Often the impression was created that positions and initiatives that contradicted the policy of the DKP and its ideological field could not be carried out or translated into concrete activities in the organization.⁴⁵

⁴² A detailed account of communist infiltration tactics and influence in the trade union movement is found in Ossip K. Flechtheim, et al., *Der Marsch der DKP durch die Institutionen*, Fisher Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1980.

⁴³ See Hugo Mueller-Vogg, "Die Krefelder und ihre Freunde," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 5, 1983.

⁴⁴ Hugo Mueller-Vogg, "Der DGB im Sog der Friedensbewegung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 29, 1982.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

In general, the effort of the "campaign from below" to mold the diverse elements that made up the peace movement into a monolithic anti-INF entity was less than successful. Nevertheless, it played a leading organizational role in the movement's activities that was far out of proportion to its numerical strength.

OPERATIONS AND INFLUENCE

The pro-Soviet elements in the peace movement achieved remarkable success in influencing the movement. Up to 3 million West German citizens participated in the various peace-movement activities. Although only 3 to 5 percent of the participants were extreme leftists or communists, this small core made up 20 percent of the participants in the key demonstrations, 40 percent of the demonstration coordinators, and well over 50 percent of the demonstration organizers.⁴⁶

The specific INF movement activities in West Germany fell into three basic categories:

1. Initial appeals and signature-gathering petitions
2. Mass demonstrations
3. Direct action, including blockades of barracks and military installations and other acts of civil disobedience, even including sabotage

The Krefeld Appeal

In all of these activities, the pro-Soviet coalition played a decisive, and often the leading role, although it usually remained in the background. The coalition's modus operandi was perfectly exemplified by its involvement and manipulation of the Krefeld Appeal.

Initiated in November 1980 at a meeting attended by representatives of many political and professional groups in Krefeld, the appeal was directed at the federal government and, under the slogan "Nuclear death threatens all of us--no to nuclear missiles in Europe," demanded that

⁴⁶ These figures represent the official estimates of the West German Ministry of the Interior as published in *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit*, p. 7.

the government withdraw support for the INF deployment. At the same time, a parallel signature-gathering initiative was undertaken. With their anti-NATO character carefully camouflaged, these efforts were presented as the result of a broad consensus and promptly gained considerable popular support. By June 1981, 1 million signatures were collected, and two years later the Krefeld Appeal was reportedly endorsed by 4 million West German citizens, making it one of the most successful--if not *the* most successful--drives of its kind in West German history.⁴⁷ In reality, the Krefeld Appeal was conceived, financed, and carried out by DKP-controlled groups, with Moscow's help, prompting a centrist labor union journal to call it the "greatest tactical achievement of the DKP since its founding."⁴⁸ The initiative was conceived by, or perhaps suggested to, the DFU leadership during visits to Moscow and East Berlin in January and May 1980; it was then coordinated with the DKP at several meetings.⁴⁹ The chief organizer was Joseph Weber, a DFU presidium member and a man with some 30 years of conspiratorial experience in the communist movement.⁵⁰ The appeal itself, an invitation to a meeting to discuss it, and a carefully prepared list of invitees, excluding well-known communists, were

⁴⁷ See Baerwald, op. cit., p. 147.

⁴⁸ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 29, 1982.

⁴⁹ See Baerwald, op. cit., pp. 142-143.

⁵⁰ For an interesting account of the behind-the-scenes activities of the DKP and Joseph Weber regarding the Krefeld Appeal, written by an ex-DKP operative, see Klaus Rainer Roehl, "Die Geschaefte des Herrn Oberst," *Spontan*, No. 4, 1981, pp. 4-10, and Werner Kahl, "Die Krefelder Geschaefte des Oberst Weber," *Die Welt*, June 1, 1981. Weber, a former Wehrmacht colonel, has been involved in pro-communist activities since the late 1940s and, by his own admission, was tried seven times for subversion and espionage in West German courts. In a remarkably open interview in a Soviet newspaper, he describes his likely recruitment by the communists upon his return from POW camp as follows: "At the recommendation of an acquaintance I went to a reception by the communists in the municipal administration. I didn't believe that anybody would want to help a Hitlerite colonel and a staff officer at that. However, the communists, my former enemies, sympathized with my problems. After some checking, my name was deleted from the list of Nazis and other war criminals subject to prosecution." See Yu. Makartsev, "Mamaev Kurgan," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 18, 1981.

presented at a DFU presidium meeting in September 1980.⁵¹ The forum took place on November 15, 1980, and immediately after the public issuance of the appeal, the DFU withdrew into the background. It was replaced by the KFAZ, which took over the management of the initiative, while the DKP itself directed the signature-gathering.⁵²

The Demonstrations

A different strategy was pursued in organizing the mass demonstrations that became the trademark of the anti-INF campaign. Aware of their numerical weakness vis-a-vis other groups in the movement, such as the Greens, the pro-Soviet coalition focused on influencing events at the preparatory stage, where they could dominate the proceedings with their superior discipline and instant availability of cadres, as well as their financial clout. This tactic was pursued at mass demonstrations on October 10, 1981, and June 10, 1982, that each attracted some 300,000 demonstrators. The October 10 demonstration was organized primarily by the two church-oriented organizations, the ASF and the AGDF (which are themselves infiltrated to a considerable extent), but the preparatory coordination committee was packed with DKP sympathizers. At least 26 of the 70 organizations participating were DKP-influenced. As a result, the tenor of the demonstration remained markedly anti-NATO and anti-American without much reference to the Soviet Union. Three of five march columns at the Bonn demonstration were under the command of DKP elements, and at least six of fifteen official speakers were pro-Soviet.⁵³

⁵¹ This carefully planned strategy is revealed in an internal memorandum sent to DFU members soliciting their cooperation in recruiting prominent noncommunists for the Krefeld meeting. Its key passage reads: "Since this is not going to be a DFU meeting as such, but we are only the initiators, we would like to approach the most prominent people possible and win them over as co-invited to the meeting and co-signers of the Appeal." See Dokument No. 4 in Gottfried Linn, *Die Kampagne gegen die NATO-Nachrüstung*, Hohwacht Verlag, Bonn, 1983, pp. 78-79.

⁵² The most detailed analysis of the DKP involvement in the Krefeld Appeal is found in Guenther Wagenlehner, "Eine 'breite Volksbewegung?': Analyse und Dokumentation zum sogenannten 'Krefeld Appeal'," *Der Heimkehrer*, September 15, 1981. The Office of the Protection of the Constitution in Nordrhein-Westfalen under whose jurisdiction Krefeld lies also documented the decisive role of the DKP in its *Bericht* for the first half of 1981. See General Anzeiger, October 13, 1981.

⁵³ Baerwald, op. cit., pp. 153-154.

The DKP elements were even better prepared and even more successful in dominating the organizational preparations for the June 10 demonstration, which was organized to protest a NATO summit meeting and the visit of President Reagan to the FRG. Early preparations began in February 1982, when 15 peace-movement organizations met at the invitation of Klaus Mannhardt, a top KFAZ official.⁵⁴ Two weeks later, the DKP presidium issued a statement denouncing Reagan's visit as a "provocation" and urged action.⁵⁵ Then on April 4, the representatives of 37 organizations met in Bonn to discuss holding an international peace demonstration on June 10. More than two-thirds of the 800 participants at the conference belonged to DKP-controlled groups, which allowed the party to completely dominate the proceedings. Four of the six members elected to the key "coordination committee" were from the DKP coalition, and all attempts to introduce resolutions even mildly critical of the Soviet Union--for example, efforts by Rudolf Bahro, a prominent Green and ex-GDR dissident, to express support for the East German peace movement--or against the suppression of Solidarity were easily voted down.⁵⁶ As a result, the demonstration, which took place under the slogan "Stand up for peace! Strengthen the resistance! No to new nuclear missiles in Europe!" and drew an estimated 350,000 demonstrators, was characterized by a strident anti-INF and anti-American tone.

The same tactics were used again in the preparatory stages of the last series of demonstrations before the INF deployments were to take place. At the main "action conference," which took place April 16-17, 1983, in Koln, more than half of the 700 general participants as well as of the speakers in the 13 working groups and in the main plenum were DKP-oriented.⁵⁷ In two follow-up preparatory meetings, "People's Assembly South" and "People's Assembly North," the pro-Soviet factions were in the majority by 60 and 75 percent, respectively.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ *Unsere Zeit*, February 27, 1982.

⁵⁵ *Unsere Zeit*, March 3, 1982.

⁵⁶ See Linn, op. cit., p 20.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 29.

⁵⁸ See *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit*, p. 16. At the "People's Assembly North," the main issue of discussion was whether the main demonstrations should take place in Hamburg (as advocated by the DKP

The Easter Marches

The so-called "Easter Peace Marches" (*Ostermaersche*), another form of anti-INF protest, started in 1982 and were dominated by the pro-Soviet coalition. Easter Marches in West Germany originated as part of a campaign against nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr organized by the SPD in 1957. These marches, which attracted considerable attention, were organized every year until 1970 even though the SPD abandoned the anti-nuclear campaign in 1959 as a result of its Bad Godesberg program, which saw a shift toward party support of the Western Alliance.

After falling increasingly under communist control in the 1960s, the Easter Marches were revived again under DKP auspices as part of the anti-INF movement in 1982. They took on a mass character in 1983.⁵⁹ As on previous occasions, the key organizational role was played by DKP-controlled fronts rather than by the party itself. As in the Krefeld Appeal, the German Peace Union (DFU) was the main organizer, actively assisted by the KFAZ and DVG-VKG. A direct indication of the DFU's leading role is the fact that all regional organizational centers for the Easter Marches, as well as the national organizational headquarters, were located in the respective DFU offices.⁶⁰ The organizers were able to stage some 90 marches throughout the country, with a claimed participation of 500,000. These marches attracted the support of not only the Greens and other anti-establishment groups, but also several unions and some SPD regional organizations.⁶¹

group) or in Bremerhaven (as suggested by the independents). The DKP modus operandi in imposing its will on the assembly is described by an independent participant as follows: "On the other hand, the DKP had overmobilized to such an extent that even some of its functionaries were embarrassed. Of the 1200 participants at the conference two-thirds belonged with certainty to its sphere, many of them having been bussed [sic] for the purpose. The advocates of Hamburg were so unwilling to compromise that a confrontation was inevitable. Speakers who spoke in favor of Bremerhaven at times couldn't finish a single sentence without being booed and shouted down." See *Atomexpress-atomuellzeitung*, Summer 1983, p. 3., cited in Linn, op. cit., p. 42.

⁵⁹ For communist and East German involvement in the Easter Marches during the 1960s, see Werner Kahl, "Die Ostermarsch-Bewegung und die Rolle von Ost-Berlin," *Die Welt*, April 10, 1984.

⁶⁰ This was revealed on March 25, 1983, by the West German Ministry of the Interior, which stated that the marches were "largely controlled by communists loyal to Moscow." See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 26, 1983

⁶¹ Ibid.

The "campaign from below," with its well-thought-out strategy and skillful organizational techniques, decidedly influenced the West German peace movement in a direction congenial to Soviet interests, prompting a Soviet observer to note with satisfaction in late 1983:

To the credit of the basic nucleus of the present anti-war movement, it has been able, surmounting its internal weaknesses and rejecting the diversionary promptings of unbidden 'well-wishers' to ascertain the central, truly decisive element at this stage of the struggle to ensure peace and security in Europe. This element, as the absolute majority of anti-war organizations acknowledges, is prevention of the deployment in Western Europe of new American nuclear weapons and the conversion of Europe into a nuclear-free zone.⁶²

⁶² L. Istyagin, "Dominant in the Antiwar Struggle," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya*, No. 10, October 1983, p. 134.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The Soviet campaign against INF failed to prevent the implementation of NATO's dual-track decision, and INF deployments in the FRG began on schedule in late 1983. This has prompted many Western observers to dismiss the campaign as an inept and wasted effort of little relevance to NATO and its future dealings with Moscow. This is a short-sighted view. Although the alliance's ability to carry out the deployments and the decline of the peace movement thereafter testified eloquently that NATO remains a viable alliance enjoying the support of the majority of West Europeans, the Soviet campaign was hardly a failure. It was a highly competent effort that holds a number of important lessons for NATO and the West.

First and foremost, it demonstrated a remarkable organizational and political capability which enabled the Soviets and their allies to exploit large numbers of noncommunists in a country that had been considered essentially free of communist--let alone Soviet--influence. This in itself is significant, since it has been increasingly assumed in the West that the Soviet Union, burdened by an increasingly ossified ideology and challenged by various Eurocommunist deviations, was no longer a relevant political factor in West European societies. Moscow's ability to mount a propaganda and "active-measures" campaign of the magnitude of the "campaign from below" is quite impressive. It also demonstrates the effective work and coordination of the various Soviet fronts, whose important role in Soviet foreign political activities is often underestimated or even dismissed. The anti-INF campaign illustrated the parallel activities of and coordination among the different elements that make up the means and instrumentalities of Soviet foreign political pursuits.

The INF campaign also achieved some perhaps unexpected results that are likely to have long-term detrimental effects on the West German political landscape and on alliance cohesion. The campaign undoubtedly contributed to the noticeable shift to the left of the SDP, as well as some of the labor unions. In mid-1984, the SPD in effect repudiated

nuclear deterrence and flexible response, the cornerstones of NATO doctrine.¹ In a remarkable about-face from its positions during the Schmidt administration, the SPD also openly encouraged its members to support the peace movement which continues to be unabashedly anti-NATO, and even offered to finance its activities.² This has, of course, led to increasing political polarization, which has largely destroyed the long-held consensus on security objectives in NATO's key European member.

The failure of the campaign to prevent the INF deployments did not precipitate either the collapse of the peace movement or the end of Soviet influence in it. Though the movement lost much of its momentum as well as most of its less-committed supporters when the first Pershings and GLCMs were emplaced, it continues to be highly visible and capable of attracting tens of thousands of sympathizers. It has also become more radical and more willing to engage in violence to achieve its objectives. By all indications, it will remain on the scene for some time to come.³ The influence of the DKP and its allies and their ability to mobilize the movement for their purposes have not visibly decreased and may even have been enhanced following the general post-deployment decline of the anti-INF movement. At several "action conferences," the pro-Soviet faction of the movement was even more dominant than it had been prior to the deployments.⁴ As part of its

¹ See "SPD fuer Abkehr von der Nuklearabschreckung," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, May 22, 1984.

² See "SPD Unterstuetzt Herbstaktionen der Friedensbewegung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 11, 1984; and Guenther Bannas, "Die Finanzen der Friedensbewegung: Die SPD engagiert sich mit Personen und Geld," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Sept. 12, 1984.

³ For instance, in late September 1984, some 30,000 demonstrators protested NATO's yearly fall maneuvers. The demonstrations were accompanied by a number of well-planned acts of vandalism and sabotage against U.S. military installations. See "Kostspielige Stoeraktionen gegen die NATO-Manoever in der Bundesrepublik," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, October 2, 1984.

⁴ See, for instance, Georg Paul Hefty, "Das naechstmal im Palast der Republik," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 14, 1984; and "Die SS 20 vergessen und vergeben: Das DKP-Umfeld beherrscht die Friedensbewegung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 8, 1984.

longer-term strategy to exploit the peace movement for its own political agenda, the DKP attempted to institutionalize the anti-INF protest by helping set up a communist-dominated electoral alliance called the "Peace List" (*Friedensliste*) for the European Parliament elections in mid-1984 and subsequent West German elections.⁵ The campaign in general seems to have created opportunities for continuing DKP influence, and has also provided it with a degree of political legitimacy among the West German left that it did not enjoy before. This in itself is a considerable achievement.

Despite the nominal failure of the anti-INF campaign, there is nothing in the experience that is likely to discourage Moscow from future use of "campaigning" as a time-tested and effective tool of Soviet foreign policy.

⁵ See "Ausbruchversuch aus dem 0.2 Prozent Getto: Die DKP und die 'Friedensliste'--Ein Buendnis auf Dauer," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 2, 1984.